South Korea’s Espionage Law Now Covers Work for Any Foreign Country

South Korea’s expanded espionage offence took effect on September 13, extending criminal liability beyond acts benefiting North Korea to qualifying conduct carried out for any foreign country or equivalent organisation. The change gives prosecutors a more serious route for cases involving national secrets, including sensitive economic, scientific and technological information.

The National Assembly passed the amendment on February 26, and it was promulgated on March 12 with a six-month delay before taking effect. The law adds Article 98-2 while preserving the older Article 98 offence for espionage benefiting an enemy state.

Key fact: The new offence carries a minimum sentence of three years in prison. The older enemy-state offence remains punishable by death, life imprisonment or at least seven years.

Why the old rule left a gap

South Korea’s previous general espionage provision was tied to an “enemy state,” a category that in practice generally meant North Korea. When an alleged leak benefited another government or a foreign company, prosecutors often had to rely on the Industrial Technology Protection Act or trade-secret statutes instead.

The National Intelligence Service says the broader offence can help deter leaks from strategic industries. Reuters cited a recent case in which five former Samsung Electronics employees were accused of transferring dynamic random-access memory technology to Chinese chipmaker CXMT. Those allegations have not been adjudicated, and the new provision does not retroactively decide that case.

What the amendment actually requires

The statutory language does not turn every unauthorised disclosure into espionage. It applies when someone, for a foreign country or comparable organisation and under its instruction, instigation or other communication, discovers, collects, discloses, transmits or intermediates a national secret, or assists such conduct.

That distinction matters for technology companies. A source file, fabrication recipe or process document may be commercially valuable, yet prosecutors would still need to establish the law’s national-secret and foreign-connection elements. Separate industrial-technology and trade-secret laws continue to cover conduct that falls outside those elements.

The measure also does not name China. Beijing said countries should protect lawful investment and provide a fair, non-discriminatory business environment. South Korea presented the amendment as country-neutral, although competition in memory chips, displays, batteries and AI hardware gives it immediate industrial significance.

What happens next

The first prosecutions will show whether Article 98-2 fills the gap supporters identified or creates difficult disputes over evidence and definition. It also sits within a wider national effort to secure strategic capabilities, including South Korea’s technology roadmap. Companies with sensitive research will need to review access controls, offboarding and cross-border collaboration without assuming that ordinary commercial disputes have become espionage cases.